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ABSTRACT—Since the 1970s, economic inequality has soared dramatically
across the globe and particularly in the United States. In that time, one of the
obstacles of using fiscal policy to address inequality has been the growing
myth of the “overtaxed American”—the misguided notion that U.S.
taxpayers pay more in taxes than residents of other advanced, industrialized
countries. This myth has persisted, in part, because of the peculiar and
distinctive nature of the fractured American fiscal and social welfare state.
Even a cursory review of comparative tax data shows that the United States,
by most measures, is a low-tax country compared to other affluent nations.
One reason for this shortfall is the missing U.S. value-added tax (VAT).
Unlike the United States, other developed countries fund robust social
spending through a balanced mix of levies, including by relying on broadbased national consumption taxes such as a VAT, which produces a
tremendous amount of government revenue. By contrast, the United States
has historically rejected comprehensive national consumption taxes,
suggesting something distinctive about American fiscal policy. This
American fiscal exceptionalism leads to a series of important research
questions that may help us understand the relationship among fiscal policy,
social welfare spending, and economic inequality: Why is the United States
such an outlier in global comparisons of national taxes? Why have
Americans historically resisted broad-based national consumption taxes of
any kind? Simply put, why is there no U.S. VAT?
This Essay begins to address these fundamental questions by, first,
synthesizing the existing literature to provide several stylized facts about
global economic inequality and the particular concentration of wealth in the
United States. Second, the Essay explores the distinctive and peculiar nature
of the modern American fiscal and social welfare state, illustrating how the
U.S. reliance on direct and progressive taxes and indirect and stealth social
welfare spending may be perpetuating the myth of the overtaxed American.
Finally, the essay identifies three key historical time periods when the United
States seriously considered, but ultimately rejected, a broad-based national
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consumption tax. This Essay focuses mainly on the first period of the early
1920s, when post-World War I historical conditions provided tax experts,
lawmakers, and social groups an opportunity to consider the adoption of a
wide-ranging national consumption tax. The Essay concludes with some
reflections on how the missing U.S. VAT may inform future tax reform and
attempts to address economic inequality.
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Law; Affiliated Professor of History, Northwestern University. Earlier
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INTRODUCTION
Since the 1970s, the United States has witnessed a dramatic increase in
economic inequality. As numerous scholars and policy analysts have
demonstrated, income and wealth disparities have grown tremendously, with
the greatest concentration of wealth existing at the top end of the
economic spectrum.1 These inequalities, moreover, have been skewed
disproportionately by race and gender.2 And they have been exacerbated by
both long-term declining opportunities for social and economic mobility and
the more recent impact of the global healthcare crisis.3
The United States is not alone. The growing concentration of wealth
and limited upward mobility have been occurring in nearly every advanced
industrialized nation-state, even as globalization and greater economic
liberalization have elevated those in poverty and raised the middle-class
standard of living in many developing countries, particularly India and

1
See EMMANUEL SAEZ & GABRIEL ZUCMAN, THE TRIUMPH OF INJUSTICE: HOW THE RICH DODGE
TAXES AND HOW TO MAKE THEM PAY 6–7 (2019) [hereinafter SAEZ & ZUCMAN, INJUSTICE]; Emmanuel
Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Wealth Inequality in the United States Since 1913: Evidence from Capitalized
Income Tax Data, 131 Q.J. ECON. 519, 520 (2016) [hereinafter Saez & Zucman, Wealth Inequality].
2
See generally DOROTHY A. BROWN, THE WHITENESS OF WEALTH: HOW THE TAX SYSTEM
IMPOVERISHES BLACK AMERICANS—AND HOW WE CAN FIX IT 1–10 (2021) (discussing how the
American tax code may disproportionally favor white families); Edward N. Wolff, The Decline of
African-American and Hispanic Wealth Since the Great Recession 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Rsch., Working Paper No. 25198, 2018), https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w25198/
w25198.pdf [https://perma.cc/35EP-MPM6] (documenting the deterioration of Black and Hispanic
household wealth compared to white households between 1983 and 2016).
3
AMBAR NARAYAN ET AL., FAIR PROGRESS? ECONOMIC MOBILITY ACROSS GENERATIONS AROUND
THE WORLD 23 (2018); cf. Raj Chetty, Nathaniel Hendren, Patrick Kline, Emmanuel Saez & Nicholas
Turner, Is the United States Still a Land of Opportunity? Recent Trends in Intergenerational Mobility,
104 AM. ECON. REV.: PAPERS & PROC. 141, 141 (2014) (finding that income inequality increased over
time for children born between 1971 and 1993).
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China.4 Still, the United States leads much of the developed world in its level
of economic disparity.5 Indeed, at least one recent U.S. President has
identified economic inequality as the “defining challenge of our time.”6
One way to address growing American economic inequality is through
national fiscal policy, namely the federal tax-and-transfer system.7 Along
with other essays in this Symposium issue, Reimagining Property in the Era
of Inequality, this Essay attempts to provide a useful foundation for
subsequent research. Specifically, this Essay’s comparative-historical
analysis outlines the role of U.S. tax law and social policy in undergirding—
and perhaps mitigating—increasing inequality in the United States.
Taxation, after all, is a critical subset of property rights.8 Tax laws
govern a fundamental relationship between individuals and the state,
between subjects and the sovereign. How and whom we tax helps define
notions of “fiscal citizenship,”9 and how wide we draw the circle of we. In
addition, the revenues generated by taxes in a liberal democracy, like the

4
Homi Kharas & Brina Seidel, What’s Happening to the World Income Distribution? The Elephant
Chart Revisited 15–16 (Glob. Econ. & Dev. at Brookings, Working Paper No. 114, 2018),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/workingpaper114-elephantchartrevisited.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7TGD-9Q55]; Christoph Lakner & Branko Milanovic, Global Income Distribution:
From the Fall of the Berlin Wall to the Great Recession, 30 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 203, 223 (2016).
5
Ho-fung Hung, Recent Trends in Global Economic Inequality, 47 ANN. REV. SOCIO. 349, 354
(2021); Arthur S. Alderson & Roshan K. Pandian, What Is Really Happening with Global Inequality?,
4 SOCIO. DEV. 261, 264 (2018); Income Inequality, OECD DATA (2022), https://data.oecd.org/inequality/
income-inequality.htm [https://perma.cc/HDK5-7XPZ] (demonstrating that the United States has the
highest income inequality of any G7 country).
6
Barack Obama, President of the United States, Remarks by the President on Economic Mobility,
(Dec. 4, 2013), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/12/04/remarks-president-economicmobility [https://perma.cc/2E75-T38M].
7
For more on this relationship, see generally the essays in INEQUALITY AND FISCAL POLICY
(Benedict J. Clements, Ruud de Mooij, Sanjeev Gupta & Michael Keen eds., 2015), discussing how fiscal
policy may reduce global income inequality.
8
See generally LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND JUSTICE
8 (2002) (noting that “[t]axes must be evaluated as part of the overall system of property rights that they
help to create”); STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST OF RIGHTS: WHY LIBERTY DEPENDS
ON TAXES 15 (1999) (explaining the necessity of taxes to protect and enforce property and welfare rights);
Isaac William Martin & Monica Prasad, Taxes and Fiscal Sociology, 40 ANN. REV. SOCIO. 331, 332
(2014) (reviewing research on the relationship between taxation, poverty, and inequality).
9
On the concept of fiscal citizenship, see generally James T. Sparrow, “Buying Our Boys Back”: The
Mass Foundations of Fiscal Citizenship in World War II, 20 J. POL’Y HIST. 263 (2008); AJAY K.
MEHROTRA, MAKING THE MODERN AMERICAN FISCAL STATE: LAW, POLITICS, AND THE RISE OF
PROGRESSIVE TAXATION, 1877–1929, at 40, 61–67 (2013); and LAWRENCE ZELENAK, LEARNING TO
LOVE FORM 1040: TWO CHEERS FOR THE RETURN-BASED INCOME TAX 17 (2013).
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United States, underwrite nearly all other realms of lawmaking, from
housing policy to environmental regulation to educational spending.10
In the past half-century, there have been many obstacles to using U.S.
fiscal policy to address growing inequality. One of the most politically
salient has been the myth of the “overtaxed” American—the misguided
notion that U.S. taxpayers pay more in taxes than individuals in other
advanced, industrialized countries.11 This canard has, in part, prevented the
United States from adopting new, more robust forms of taxation. Even
though tax revenues provide the funds necessary for nearly every aspect of
government, many politicians and everyday Americans continue to cling to
the antiquated notion that a modern regulatory, administrative, social welfare
state can function effectively with insufficient taxes and limited government.
To support this view, many political leaders on the right have perpetuated
the myth that Americans are overtaxed compared to our
global counterparts.12
One possible reason why this myth has persisted is the peculiar and
distinctive nature of the modern American fiscal and social welfare state.
The revenue-extraction side of U.S. fiscal policy (i.e., taxation) is, for the
most part, highly visible and direct. Although scholars have disagreed about
the cognitive impact of different types of taxes, most concur that direct taxes,
like progressive income taxes, are generally more prominent and thus more

10
My fellow authors that participated in the Northwestern University Law Review 2021 Symposium,
Reimagining Property in the Era of Inequality, discuss each of these topics in detail. See, e.g., Carol M.
Rose, Property Law and Inequality: Lessons from Racially Restrictive Covenants, 117 Nw. U. L. Rev.
225 (2022) (reviewing the history of racially restrictive covenants and their role in curtailing opportunities
for Black communities to acquire and pass on wealth); LaToya Baldwin Clark, Family | Home | School,
117 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1 (2022) (arguing that school residency laws perpetuate race–class–gender
subordination of and restrict access to education for children from family structures that do not reflect the
archetypical nuclear family); Laura S. Underkuffler, Challenging Equality: Property Loss, Government
Fault, and the Global Warming Catastrophe, 117 Nw. U. L. Rev. 335 (2022) (arguing that the increase
in severity and cost of catastrophic events due to climate change will force a change in traditional losscompensation solutions such as insurance and direct government relief payments).
11
See generally Kenneth Rapoza, Are Americans Overtaxed?, FORBES (Mar. 14, 2013, 5:06 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2013/03/14/are-americans-over-taxed/ [https://perma.cc/34MJEJC8] (arguing that Americans are not overtaxed based on a comparison of national salary); William G.
Gale, Are Americans Really Overtaxed?, BROOKINGS (Feb. 24, 1999), https://www.brookings.edu/
opinions/are-americans-really-overtaxed [https://perma.cc/KM4H-BJBM] (finding that the tax burden on
Americans has decreased over time); Howard Gleckman & Aravind Boddupalli, No, the US Is Not
Overtaxed, TAX POL’Y CTR. (Aug. 20, 2019), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/no-us-notovertaxed [https://perma.cc/AW89-TXXK] (stating that Americans are taxed less than residents of other
developed countries).
12
See infra notes 89–92 and accompanying text.
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economically salient to most taxpayers.13 By contrast, many Americans take
for granted the array of goods and services provided by the modern state. By
definition, basic public goods—from roads to national defense to public
health funding—belong to everyone. Using the language of public
economics, pure public or collective goods are those that are
“nonexcludable” and “nonrivalrous.” Everyone benefits from public goods,
and one person’s consumption does not limit the amount of the good
for others.14
In the realm of social spending, many of the benefits furnished by the
government to individuals and families are provided indirectly, often
through the tax code itself or through private channels. From the Earned
Income Tax Credit (EITC) to employer-provided healthcare coverage and
retirement savings, the federal government provides vital anti-poverty and
social welfare benefits indirectly via “tax expenditures.”15 These benefits,
moreover, are generally linked to participation in the formal labor market,
and thus subsumed as part of everyday employment. As a result, the spending
side of the American fiscal state is often hidden, fractured by public–private
social benefits, submerged from the surface, and hence less visible to the
public.16 In sum, Americans may feel the grip or pinch of direct and
13

See, e.g., Edward J. McCaffery, Cognitive Theory and Tax, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1861, 1864 (1994)
(arguing that cognitive biases help explain “major structural features” of the American tax system); Raj
Chetty, Adam Looney & Kory Kroft, Salience and Taxation: Theory and Evidence, 99 AM. ECON. REV.
1145, 1146 (2009) (finding that “commodity taxes that are included in the posted prices that consumers
see when shopping (and are thus more salient) have larger effects on demand”); David Gamage & Darien
Shanske, Three Essays on Tax Salience: Market Salience and Political Salience, 65 N.Y.U. TAX L. REV.
19, 98 (2011) (reviewing empirical literature on market and political salience to argue for improving
policymakers’ understanding of tax salience); Jacob Goldin, Optimal Tax Salience, 131 J. PUB. ECON.
115, 115 (2015) (studying the salience of commodity taxes and finding that low-salience taxes decrease
“the burden . . . associated with distortionary taxes” but cause “taxpayers to make optimization errors”).
14
JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 128–29 (2000); N. GREGORY MANKIW,
PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 209–22 (6th ed. 2012).
15
Tax expenditures are generally defined as revenue losses resulting from tax provisions that grant
special tax relief to encourage certain behavior or to aid taxpayers in particular circumstances. Jane G.
Gravelle, Tax Expenditures, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TAXATION AND TAX POLICY 406–08 (Joseph J.
Cordes, Robert D. Ebel & Jane G. Gravelle eds., 2005).
16
See generally CHRISTOPHER HOWARD, THE HIDDEN WELFARE STATE: TAX EXPENDITURES AND
SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 3, 13 (1999) (describing the concept of viewing certain tax
expenditures as a form of “hidden welfare”); JACOB S. HACKER, THE DIVIDED WELFARE STATE: THE
BATTLE OVER PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SOCIAL BENEFITS IN THE UNITED STATES 7 (2002) (reviewing
America’s public–private welfare regime and discussing “how it shapes the politics of social policy in
the United States”); MARIE GOTTSCHALK, THE SHADOW WELFARE STATE: LABOR, BUSINESS, AND THE
POLITICS OF HEALTHCARE IN THE UNITED STATES, at viii (2000) (using healthcare reform in the United
States to address questions “related to the politics of economic restructuring”); K IMBERLY J. MORGAN &
ANDREAS LOUISE CAMPBELL, THE DELEGATED WELFARE STATE: MEDICARE, MARKETS, AND THE
GOVERNANCE OF SOCIAL POLICY 4 (2011) (discussing delegated governance in the United States using
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progressive taxes, but public goods and subsidized social welfare benefits
often go unnoticed or are taken for granted.
In contrast to the U.S. system, other advanced, industrialized countries
provide social welfare benefits and attempt to address economic inequality
in more direct ways, frequently through progressive, citizenship-based
public sector expenditures such as national education and healthcare.17 These
nation-states fund their large public sectors by taxing their citizens and
residents through a balanced mix of levies, including by relying on robust
broad-based national consumption taxes such as a value-added tax (VAT).18
Indirect consumption taxes, like a VAT, not only produce tremendous public
revenue, but also frequently go less noticed by taxpayers.19
Generally, a VAT is remitted by an entity in each stage of the
production and distribution process, although the ultimate buyer of the good
or service may bear the tax. Consumers who pay the VAT generally see a
small levy on each purchase, as opposed to a large sum each April from direct
income taxes. Reliance on the VAT may, in turn, explain the strength and
resilience of many European social welfare states, as some scholars have
argued,20 though the correlation between abundant VAT revenues and robust

the 2003 Medicare Modernization Act as an example); SUZANNE METTLER, THE SUBMERGED STATE:
HOW INVISIBLE GOVERNMENT POLICIES UNDERMINE AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 7 (2011) (arguing that a
lack of transparency in government spending threatens American democracy).
17
See GøSTA ESPING-ANDERSEN, THE THREE WORLDS OF WELFARE CAPITALISM 26–27 (1990);
KEES VAN KERSBERGEN & BARBARA VIS, COMPARATIVE WELFARE STATE POLITICS: DEVELOPMENT,
OPPORTUNITIES, AND REFORM 2 (2014).
18
A value-added tax is a consumption tax assessed on the value added at each stage of the production
process for a good or service. It is often similar in its economic effects to a retail sales tax, which many
U.S. state and local governments levy. Unlike a sales tax, which is collected by the retailer at the point of
sale of goods and services, a VAT is collected by business entities in each stage of the production process.
LEONARD E. BURMAN & JOEL SLEMROD, TAXES IN AMERICA: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 98–
100 (2d ed. 2020); see also Martin A. Sullivan, Introduction: Getting Acquainted with VAT, in THE VAT
READER: WHAT A FEDERAL CONSUMPTION TAX WOULD MEAN FOR AMERICA 7, 12–13 (2011)
(discussing the impact of a VAT system); ALAN SCHENK & OLIVER OLDMAN, VALUE ADDED TAX: A
COMPARATIVE APPROACH 16–17 (2007) (explaining the European Commission’s VAT system).
19
McCaffery, supra note 13, at 1886; Chetty et al., supra note 13, at 1165.
20
See generally JUNKO KATO, REGRESSIVE TAXATION AND THE WELFARE STATE: PATH
DEPENDENCE AND POLICY DIFFUSION 1, 3, 199 (2003) (examining how resilient welfare states are
generally funded by a VAT); MONICA PRASAD, THE LAND OF TOO MUCH: AMERICAN ABUNDANCE AND
THE PARADOX OF POVERTY, at xii–xiii (2012) (arguing that differences in U.S. poverty compared to
European nations can be attributed to the United States’ pattern of progressive taxation); KATHRYN
JAMES, THE RISE OF THE VALUE-ADDED TAX 8 (2019) (examining and explaining the widespread
implementation of VAT systems). Professor Kato’s research indicates that countries with regressive
consumption taxes frequently use progressive social welfare spending to overcome regressive tax
incidence, and those countries that have had more long-standing commitments to the combination of
regressive consumption taxes and progressive social spending have been able to withstand recent attacks
on the social welfare state. KATO, supra, at 1, 9.
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social spending does not imply causation.21 In this sense, the United States is
a stark outlier in the conspicuous absence of an American VAT. Whereas all
other advanced, industrialized countries have a comprehensive national
consumption tax in the form of a VAT, the United States has historically
rejected broad-based national consumption taxes, suggesting something
distinctive about American fiscal policy.22
This American fiscal exceptionalism23 leads to a series of important
questions that may help us understand the relationship between fiscal policy
and economic inequality: Why is the United States such an outlier in global
comparisons of national taxes? Why are overall U.S. taxes lower than
similarly situated countries? And why have Americans historically resisted
broad-based national consumption taxes of any kind? Simply put, why is
there no U.S. VAT?
This Essay begins to address these fundamental questions by providing
some important background information about growing economic
inequality, the peculiar nature of the modern American fiscal and social
welfare state, and the historical evolution of U.S. resistance to broad-based
national consumption taxes.
The Essay proceeds in three parts. Part I synthesizes the existing
scholarly literature on economic inequality, illustrating through a series of
stylized facts how the high-end concentration of wealth has increased
dramatically since the 1970s across the globe, especially in the United States.
Part II shows how the combination of direct and progressive taxes on income
and the shrouded nature of U.S. social spending have helped perpetuate the
myth of the “overtaxed” American. Part III explores the fundamental
question of why the United States has failed to adopt a more robust form of
indirect, comprehensive, national consumption taxes. Exploring this
comparative-historical query may shed light on the origins of U.S. economic

21
Steffen Ganghof, Tax Mixes and the Size of the Welfare State: Causal Mechanisms and Policy
Implications, 16 J. EUR. SOC. POL’Y 360, 370–71 (2006). Ganghof raises the important point that many
strong European social welfare states may have preceded the rise of the VAT, indicating that the demand
for greater public revenue has driven the adoption of VATs in other countries. Id. at 362, 364–66.
22
KATO, supra note 20, at 113; JAMES, supra note 20, at 12–13. The United States has had national
excise taxes on particular goods, such as alcohol and tobacco, throughout its history, but we have resisted
broad-based, comprehensive consumption taxes at the national level. On the history of national excise
taxes, see generally W. ELLIOT BROWNLEE, FEDERAL TAXATION IN AMERICA: A SHORT HISTORY 1–8
(1994), reviewing the history of American tax systems and discussing recent trends in tax policies.
23
To be sure, the notion of “American exceptionalism” has come under increasing scholarly scrutiny.
See generally RETHINKING AMERICAN HISTORY IN A GLOBAL AGE (Thomas Bender ed., 2002) (placing
the development of the United States within the context of globalization); GODFREY HODGSON, THE
MYTH OF AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM, at xiv–xvi, 14–15 (2009) (tracing the notion of American
exceptionalism throughout the United States’ development and challenging its validity).
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inequality and how lawmakers might use fiscal policy to address the growing
disparities in wealth and opportunity.
More specifically, this final Part identifies three key historical time
periods when the United States considered, but ultimately rejected, a national
consumption tax—a tax that might have evolved into a modern VAT and
perhaps been the foundation for a more vigorous American fiscal and social
welfare state. The Essay ends with a conclusion and coda about the promise
and limits of a U.S. VAT in addressing economic inequality.
I.

STYLIZED FACTS ABOUT ECONOMIC INEQUALITY

In recent years, empirical research about economic inequality has
become a cottage industry among scholars, especially among French and
American economists. Thanks to the scholarship of Emmanuel Saez, Gabriel
Zucman, and of course Thomas Piketty,24 among others,25 there are now a
series of “stylized facts” about the changing landscape of economic
inequality in the United States and across most of the world.26 This wellestablished literature has shown that over the last few decades there has been
variation in how the forces of globalization and economic liberalization have
affected different segments of the world’s population. While poverty has
declined and the middle class has grown in some developing countries,
namely China and India, the upper-middle classes across the world have
stagnated while the super-wealthy have prospered. Meanwhile, income
inequality within countries has increased dramatically, with the
concentration of wealth at the top end of the spectrum skyrocketing,
24
See, e.g., Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Distributional National Accounts:
Methods and Estimates for the United States, 133 Q.J. ECON. 553, 553 (2018) (using a combination of
data types to calculate pre- and post-tax income in America and drawing conclusions about redistribution
and inequality); Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, Income Inequality in the United States, 1913–1998,
118 Q.J. ECON. 1, 1–41 (2003) (using empirical tax data to show how economic inequality has decreased
and then increased during the long twentieth century); Gabriel Zucman, Global Wealth Inequality,
11 ANN. REV. ECON. 109, 119–22, 124–26 (2019) (performing a similar analysis on a global scale). These
French economists fall in a long line of astute French observers of American politics and culture. See
generally ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 4, 11 (Henry Reeve trans., 2002) (1835)
(observing the early development of democracy in America).
25
See, e.g., ANTHONY B. ATKINSON, INEQUALITY: WHAT CAN BE DONE? 9–14, 16–23 (2015)
(summarizing foundational works in empirical economic equality scholarship); AMARTYA SEN & JAMES
FOSTER, ON ECONOMIC INEQUALITY 2–10 (1997) (outlining measurements and methodologies for
empirical economic welfare research); GANESH SITARAMAN, THE CRISIS OF THE MIDDLE-CLASS
CONSTITUTION: WHY ECONOMIC INEQUALITY THREATENS OUR REPUBLIC 227–30 (2017) (describing
empirical studies that depict a shrinking American middle class and decreased economic mobility).
26
See Stylized Facts, DICTIONARY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (Craig Calhoun ed., 2002). The term
“stylized facts” is generally associated with the mid-twentieth-century economist Nicholas Kaldor, who
argued that economic theorists should work from “a ‘stylized’ view of the facts” by concentrating on
“broad tendencies, ignoring individual details.” Nicholas Kaldor, Capital Accumulation and Economic
Growth, in THE THEORY OF CAPITAL 177, 178 (D.C. Hague ed., 1961).
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especially in the United States. This section summarizes these stylized
facts.27
Although scholars and researchers have disagreed about the exact
contours of shifts in economic inequality, there are a few points of general
agreement. First, many analysts agree that since the 1980s, global inequality,
as measured by cross-country comparisons, has actually decreased. For
example, using one standard economic metric for inequality, the Gini
coefficient,28 scholars have shown that population-weighted, real income
inequality between countries has declined from a Gini of roughly 0.6 in the
1970s to a Gini below 0.5 by 2014, meaning that global inequality has
diminished.29 This decline has been driven mainly by rapid industrialization
and accompanying income growth among the poor and lower-middle classes
in developing countries, mainly China and India. Because these two
countries alone account for over 36% of the world’s population, their income
growth offsets a drop in other parts of the global South and developing
world.30 Thus, between-country estimates have demonstrated that global
inequality has been declining in the last few decades.31
By contrast, the second stylized fact indicates that for the past four
decades or so, economic disparities within countries have increased
dramatically across the world. Using a wide variety of evidence, from
household surveys to tax administrative data, scholars have shown that
income inequality, in particular, has increased in roughly two-thirds of the
world’s societies since the 1980s, with greater disparities in the developing
world.32 The average increase has generally been striking. According to one
set of estimates, between the 1980s and 2010s, the median level of income
inequality increased roughly 4.5 Gini points.33
There has been a similar upward trend for wealth inequality. Since the
1980s, within-country wealth concentration has been growing. Focusing
27
In this sense, this first section is meant to be a concise synthesis of the existing social science and
law review literature on economic inequality.
28
The Gini coefficient is an often-used, albeit imperfect, metric to measure the dispersion of income
across an entire income distribution. Gini coefficients range from zero, indicating perfect equality, to one,
denoting perfect inequality. Gini Coefficient, DICTIONARY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (Craig Calhoun ed.,
2002); STIGLITZ, supra note 14, at 121.
29
Alderson & Pandian, supra note 5, at 267.
30
Id. at 271.
31
Hung, supra note 5, at 352–53.
32
Alderson & Pandian, supra note 5, at 262–63. See generally James K. Galbraith, Inequality and
Economic and Political Change: A Comparative Perspective, 4 CAMBRIDGE J. REGIONS, ECON. & SOC’Y
13, 21–22 (2011) (describing changes in inequality in the world economy since 1963); BRANKO
MILANOVIC, GLOBAL INEQUALITY: A NEW APPROACH FOR THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 19–20 (2016)
(examining factors that increase global inequality).
33
Alderson & Pandian, supra note 5, at 264.
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mainly on the top 1% of the global spectrum, researchers have shown that
the world’s leading economies have witnessed greater wealth concentration.
More specifically, the top 1% wealth share for China, Europe, and the United
States combined has increased from 28% in 1980 to roughly 33% in 2019.34
Meanwhile, the bottom 75% share has stagnated at 10%.35 Simply put, the
world’s rich have gotten richer while others have not over the last
four decades.
Third, there is near consensus that since the 1980s, both income and
wealth disparities in the United States have grown markedly. In fact, there
has been an explosion of research documenting the rise of economic
inequality in the United States, with a particular focus on the concentration
of wealth among the richest Americans. This near consensus appears to
persist even as scholars continue to debate the different ways to measure
income and wealth.36 One useful metric demonstrating the increasing
disparity is the share of pretax income earned by different segments of
American income earners. As the research of Saez and Zucman illustrates,
the wealthiest Americans have doubled their share of the total economic pie
in the last forty years.37 In the 1980s, the richest Americans, those in the top
one percent of income earners, received roughly 10% of the nation’s total
pretax income (before government taxes and transfers), while the working
class and poor (the bottom 50%) earned around 20% at that time.38 By 2019,
these figures were practically inverted.39 The richest (top one percent) were
capturing more than 20% of national income, while the bottom half was
collecting about 12%.40
Similar trends exist for American wealth concentration. Although
reliable estimates related to wealth are more difficult to collect for the United
States, mainly due to the lack of data, recent estimates suggest that the highend of the American economic spectrum continues to accumulate

34
Zucman, supra note 24, at 111; see, e.g., Florian Scheuer & Joel Slemrod, Taxing Our Wealth,
35 J. ECON. PERSPS. 207, 207 (2021) (“In 2016, . . . the top 1 percent of households ranked by net worth
held 40 percent of US wealth . . . .”).
35
Zucman, supra note 24, at 111.
36
See generally Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Trends in U.S. Income and Wealth Inequality:
Revising After the Revisionists (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 27921, 2020),
https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w27921/w27921.pdf [https://perma.cc/L3HV-8RK]
(reviewing past studies on income inequality and finding that income inequality continues to rise);
Matthew Smith, Danny Yagan, Owen Zidar & Eric Zwick, Capitalists in the Twenty-First Century,
134 Q.J. ECON. 1675, 1676–78 (2019) (using administrative tax data to “characterize top incomes”).
37
SAEZ & ZUCMAN, INJUSTICE, supra note 1, at 6.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id.
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astonishing amounts of resources.41 In 1980, the top one percent of wealthiest
tax units owned roughly 23% of total assets. By 2020, that figure nearly
doubled to almost 40%.42 Such growing concentration of wealth is even more
pronounced for higher tax units. As Saez and Zucman have recently
concluded, “[b]y any metric, the period from 1980 to 2020 has been an era
of extraordinary wealth accumulation among the rich in the United States.”43
Even when accounting for the potential impact of redistributive
government tax-and-transfer laws and policies, the wealthiest Americans
still prospered tremendously, while the working class witnessed only
moderate relief. In 2018, the United States had the second-highest level of
wealth inequality among thirty-three Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, after taking into account
taxes and transfers.44 Such a finding suggests that well-intentioned fiscal and
social policy by itself has done little to alter the acceleration of inequality.
This has been a longstanding historical trend. From 1977 to 2014, the top
one percent’s share of national income, before taxes and transfers, increased
by nearly 90%. After accounting for tax and transfer, the top one percent’s
share still managed to increase by more than 81%. In other words,
progressive taxes appear to have had only a modest dampening effect. At the
opposite end of the spectrum, the bottom 50% saw their share of national
income decline to about 20%, post tax and transfer, instead of 26% pretax
and transfer over the same period. Thus, the American social welfare state
has only modestly cushioned the slide.45
In fact, these trends are even more pronounced when one goes beyond
the top one percent and looks more closely at the über-wealthy in America
today, who have been particularly skilled at limiting their tax liability.46 The
causes behind these trends are, of course, multifaceted and beyond the scope
of this brief Essay. But we know that worldwide changes in technology,
economic globalization, international tax competition, increased
41

See Scheuer & Slemrod, supra note 34, at 207.
Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, The Rise of Income and Wealth Inequality in America:
Evidence from Distributional Macroeconomic Accounts, 34 J. ECON. PERSPS. 3, 10 fig.1 (2020).
43
Id. at 11. A “tax unit” is a term of art in tax scholarship. It refers to “an individual or married
couple that files a tax return or would file a tax return if their income were high enough, along with all
dependents of that individual or married couple.” TPC’s Microsimulation Model FAQ, TAX POL’Y CTR.,
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/resources/tpcs-microsimulation-model-faq
[https://perma.cc/9DD5L4M3].
44
Lily Batchelder & David Kamin, Taxing the Rich: Issues and Options 2 (Sept.
11, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3452274
[https://perma.cc/L2WQ-9SQA].
45
See ADAM TOOZE, CRASHED: HOW A DECADE OF FINANCIAL CRISES CHANGED THE WORLD
458 (2018).
46
See Saez & Zucman, Wealth Inequality, supra note 1, at 519.
42
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deregulation of finance, relentless assaults on progressive taxation, excessive
executive compensation, the decimation of organized labor, and related
factors have widened the earnings gap between ordinary, working-class
Americans and the most affluent.47
Consider a final startling comparison of wages. In 1965, the average
chief executive officer made about twenty-four times as much as an average
worker.48 By 1978, that ratio climbed to thirty-five times as much.49 By 1989,
it was seventy-one times as much. And by 2000, the figure had skyrocketed
to nearly three hundred times as much.50 The C-suite has come to dominate
the shop floor like never before.
II. THE FRACTURED U.S. FISCAL/SOCIAL WELFARE STATE AND THE
MYTH OF THE “OVERTAXED” AMERICAN
As the earlier set of stylized facts indicates, U.S. fiscal and social
welfare policies have only modestly mitigated the dramatic increase in
American economic inequality. One possible reason for this limitation is the
institutional design of the U.S. fiscal and social welfare state. Indeed, the
combination of a highly salient system of direct and progressive taxation and
a more “hidden” social welfare state has helped perpetuate the myth of the
“overtaxed” American—a myth that has been exploited by politicians and
lawmakers for decades. As a result, many U.S. policymakers and taxpayers
alike seem unaware of the unique and peculiar aspects of the American
system of taxes and transfers, and what those aspects might tell us about the
relationship among taxes, inequality, and social welfare spending.
By most definitions, the tax side of fiscal policy entails a legal
obligation on taxpayers to contribute money or goods to the state in exchange
for nothing in particular. Certain tax revenues, to be sure, are often
47
See generally GRETA R. KRIPPNER, CAPITALIZING ON CRISIS: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF THE
RISE OF FINANCE 60, 83–85 (2011) (discussing the historical events that contributed to the evolution of
finance in the United States); PRASAD, supra note 20, at 170–71; QUINN SLOBODIAN, THE GLOBALISTS:
THE END OF EMPIRE AND THE BIRTH OF NEOLIBERALISM 1–26 (2018) (tracing the history of
neoliberalism in the establishment of the world economy); MONICA PRASAD, STARVING THE BEAST:
RONALD REAGAN AND THE TAX CUT REVOLUTION 121–24 (2018) (examining the history of tax-cut
policies in the United States and its ties to the political agenda of the Republican party); Reuven S. AviYonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REV.
1573, 1578 (2000) (describing “the problems of tax competition” and developing solutions that balance
competing needs).
48
KEVIN M. KRUSE & JULIAN E. ZELIZER, FAULT LINES: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES SINCE
1974, at 234 (2019); Lawrence Mishel, CEO-to-Worker Pay Imbalance Grows, ECON. POL’Y INST. (June
21, 2006), https://www.epi.org/publication/webfeatures_snapshots_20060621 [https://perma.cc/T4R5DR6J].
49
Mishel, supra note 48.
50
Id.
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earmarked for particular uses. But in most modern liberal democracies,
taxation comes with the implicit premise that resources will be extracted
equitably from different taxpayers, and that tax revenues will be spent on
public or collective goods and services.51
Indeed, taxes have been defined historically as a coercive part of state
power. In 1888, one leading American economic theorist, Richard T. Ely,
characterized taxes as “one-sided transfers of economic goods or services
demanded of the citizens . . . by the constituted authorities of the land.”52 A
century later, the World Bank similarly described taxes as “unrequited,
compulsory payments collected primarily by central governments.”53 At the
same time, taxpayers have generally complied with their tax obligations not
only out of fear of punishment because it is demanded or compulsory, but
also because they believe others are in compliance and because they see the
tangible benefits of their contributions to the public sector. The notion of
what scholars have referred to as “quasi-voluntary compliance” thus entails
both a highly punitive aspect, namely the possibility of penalty for
noncompliance, and a normative element that taxes are levied fairly and for
good use.54
If modern taxes rest on “quasi-voluntary compliance,” the particular
design of the U.S. tax system seems to skew towards those levies which are
most prominent, visible, and open to state coercion.55 Compared to most
other advanced industrial democracies, the United States as a whole relies
significantly more on the direct taxation of income and property—two highly
salient types of tax bases.56 Even a cursory examination of data from the
51

See generally CAROLYN WEBBER & AARON WILDAVSKY, A HISTORY OF TAXATION AND
EXPENDITURE IN THE WESTERN WORLD (1986) (examining how different governments have handled
common tax issues).
52
RICHARD T. ELY, TAXATION IN AMERICAN STATES AND CITIES 6–7 (Thomas Y. Crowell & Co.
1888) (emphasis added).
53
THE WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT: ISSUES IN PUBLIC FINANCE 79 (1988)
(emphasis added).
54
MARGARET LEVI, OF RULE AND REVENUE 56–58 (1988). For further discussion of quasi-voluntary
compliance, see WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES: TAX COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT (Joel Slemrod ed.,
1992); ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR
COLLECTIVE ACTION 94–95 (1990); and Itai Grinberg, The Battle over Taxing Offshore Accounts,
60 UCLA L. REV. 304, 355 (2012).
55
Although there is variation in the tax literature on what makes a particular levy more or less salient,
there appears to be general agreement that direct taxes on income and property are cognitively more
prominent in the minds of taxpayers than indirect taxes like the retail sales tax. For further information
on salience, see supra note 13 and accompanying text.
56
For property tax salience, see, for example, Marika Cabral & Caroline Hoxby, The Hated Property
Tax: Salience, Tax Rates, and Tax Revolts 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 18514,
2012) (“[Property tax] is more likely to be salient than taxes that are indirect, rolled into gross-of-tax
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OECD shows the stark contrast. In 2019, individual income taxes (at the
federal, state, and local level combined) were the primary source of U.S. tax
revenue, accounting for nearly 41% of total tax revenue.57 By contrast,
OECD countries on average raised 24% of total tax revenue from individual
income taxes.58 Likewise, the direct taxation of property differs dramatically.
Whereas the average OECD country raised only about 6% of total tax
revenue from property taxes, the U.S. figure is twice as high, at more than
12% of total tax revenue.59
More specifically, the U.S. federal government relies heavily on
income and payroll taxes, which are generally considered more prominent,
visible, and salient than consumption taxes.60 In 2019, approximately 57% of
total federal tax revenue came from individual (50%) and corporate (7%)
taxes, with another 36% from payroll taxes related to social insurance
programs such as Social Security and Medicare.61
These levies are clearly legible in the paychecks and withholding
figures of all American wage earners. The high visibility and salience of
these direct and often graduated taxes makes the collection process of U.S.
taxation starker and more excruciating than other more indirect forms of
taxation, such as consumption taxes, which are often blended into the price
of goods and services. While everyday workers may not be aware of or
regularly pay attention to how much of their paychecks go to income tax
withholding or Social Security, they are well aware that their net income
does not match their gross receipts.62 Similarly, every April 15, U.S.
taxpayers are reminded of the arduous process of filing their income taxes
where they get to reconcile just how much of their annual earnings have gone
to the federal government.63
prices, collected through withholding, fragmented, or otherwise difficult to compute or notice.”). For
income tax salience, see, for example, Amy N. Finkelstein, E-ZTax: Tax Salience and Tax Rates, 124 Q.J.
ECON. 969, 969–70 (2009) (citing concerns that “lower visibility of a VAT [relative to income tax] would
affect the size of government”).
57
Revenue Statistics - OECD Countries: Comparative Tables, OECD.STAT, https://stats.oecd.org/
index.aspx?DataSetCode=REV [https://perma.cc/3ML8-LMS2].
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
61
See OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, HISTORICAL TABLES tbl.2.1, https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/
budget/historical-tables/ [https://perma.cc/K3A5-2TTE].
62
See VANESSA S. WILLIAMSON, READ MY LIPS: WHY AMERICANS ARE PROUD TO PAY TAXES 14–
15 (2017).
63
See ZELENAK, supra note 9, at 1–2; WILLIAMSON, supra note 62, at 13; Ajay K. Mehrotra, Reviving
Fiscal Citizenship, 113 MICH. L. REV. 943, 943 (2015) (“April 15 is a day that most Americans dread.
That date is, of course, when federal and nearly all state-level individual income tax returns are due.”);
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It is this aspect of direct taxation—its cognitive prominence or highly
conspicuous nature—that has fueled tensions between taxpayers and the
state, across both space and time. To be sure, the introduction of any type of
new tax, direct or indirect, is frequently accompanied by some level of
protest.64 Thus, it is difficult to generalize about the popularity of
particular taxes.65
Still, we know that policy design and broader social, political, and
economic conditions often affect the reception of new taxes. Under some
circumstances, when taxes are levied as part of a national emergency, such
as war or economic catastrophe, taxpayers may embrace the need to support
the civic community and hence the state through increased taxes.66 At other
times, when rates reach unexpectedly high levels or the benefits of taxes are
ambiguous or provided to perceived outsiders, taxes are less acceptable.67
In the United States, even the founding of the Republic is often
associated with a tax revolt.68 Unsurprisingly, commentators have debated
the virtues and vices related to the pain of paying taxes.69 Yet many agree
that the existing U.S. system of income taxation, based on withholding and
return filing, makes taxpayers highly cognizant of the coercive impact
of taxation.70

see also Dennis J. Ventry Jr., Americans Don’t Hate Taxes, They Hate Paying Taxes, 44 U.B.C. L. REV.
835, 841 (2011) (arguing that Americans do not necessarily hate taxes but rather hate navigating the
“unduly burdensome process of paying” their taxes).
64
See generally Isaac William Martin & Nadav Gabay, Tax Policy and Tax Protest in 20 Rich
Democracies, 1980–2010, 69 BRITISH J. SOCIO. 647, 648 (2018). Historians of democracy have shown
that the introduction of new VATs has also triggered social protests. See PAUL ALMEIDA, MOBILIZING
DEMOCRACY: GLOBALIZATION AND CITIZEN PROTEST 1–9 (2014).
65
Isaac William Martin & Heather Harper, What Makes a Tax Policy Popular? Predicting
Referendum Votes from Policy Text, SOCIUS: SOCIO. RSCH. FOR A DYNAMIC WORLD (Jan. 1, 2021),
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/23780231211066069 [https://perma.cc/QH9P-QRSK].
66
For more on how taxpayer consciousness and fiscal citizenship are heightened during national
emergencies, see generally Mehrotra, supra note 63, at 944; and ZELENAK, supra note 63, at 1–2.
67
Martin & Harper, supra note 65, at 9.
68
BROWNLEE, supra note 22, at 2; Joseph J. Thorndike, A Tax Revolt or Revolting Taxes?,
TAXANALYSTS (Dec. 14, 2005), http://www.taxhistory.org/thp/readings.nsf/ArtWeb/1BC5839831CD15
EE852570DD0061D496 [https://perma.cc/L8WU-WHTX].
69
See, e.g., Joseph J. Thorndike, Hurts So Good, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2005) (arguing that the pain
of paying taxes “keeps people vigilant” and helps hold the government in check); Grover Norquist,
President, Ams. For Tax Reform, President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform: Ninth Meeting
119–21 (May 17, 2005) (comparing the argument for less painful tax filing to the argument for the
guillotine); Lawrence Zelenak, Justice Holmes, Ralph Kramden, and the Civic Virtues of a Tax Return
Filing Requirement, 61 TAX L. REV. 53, 57 (2007) (explaining that some argue that “taxes should be as
visible and painful as possible, on the theory that the public will resist high levels of visible and
painful taxes”).
70
See Zelenak, supra note 69, at 57–59.
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At the other end of U.S. fiscal policy—the transfer side of the tax-andtransfer system—American social welfare benefits are frequently provided
in a much more inconspicuous manner. They are delivered either indirectly
via the Internal Revenue Code or through public/private partnerships that
obscure the pivotal role of the federal government. Indeed, as numerous
scholars of comparative political economy have shown, the American
welfare state is not so much a laggard compared to other affluent countries
as it is a “hidden welfare state.”71
The expansive and generous use of “tax expenditures”—as opposed to
direct spending—to achieve social welfare objectives is one reason why the
American welfare state is largely invisible to most everyday taxpayers.
Popularly known as “tax breaks,” these tax expenditures are technically
defined as “departures from the normal tax structure . . . designed to favor a
particular industry, activity, or class of persons.”72 Generally, tax
expenditures take the form of deductions, credits, and outright tax
exclusions, as well as preferential tax rates and even tax deferrals.73 Within
social policy, tax expenditures effectively parallel direct spending for things
like “income security, health care, employment and training, housing, social
services, education, and veterans’ benefits,” to name a few.74 Rather than
provide direct expenditures for these social welfare benefits based on
citizenship or residency, as most other advanced countries do, the United
States subsidizes these activities based mainly on employment status and tax
payments. In short, by not taxing individuals, or by providing refunds on
taxes already paid, tax expenditures essentially disguise the many ways in
which the United States delivers anti-poverty relief, as well as social benefits
to the middle class and the affluent.75
The scale and scope of U.S. tax expenditures supporting social policy
underscore how prevalent and important this type of indirect spending is to
the modern American fiscal and social welfare state. Overall, U.S. tax
expenditures in 2019 totaled roughly $1.2 trillion, or nearly 5.8% of GDP.76

71

HOWARD, supra note 16, at 3–12; Jeffrey P. Owens, Tax Expenditures and Direct Expenditures
as Instruments of Social Policy, in COMPARATIVE TAX STUDIES 171, 175–78 (Sijbren Cnossen ed., 1983).
72
HOWARD, supra note 16, at 3 (quoting STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX
EXPENDITURES 2–3 (1985)). Surrey is often regarded as the intellectual godfather of tax-expenditure
analysis. See generally Lawrence Zelenak & Ajay K. Mehrotra, Editors’ Introduction—Stanley S. Surrey:
A Life in Taxes, in A HALF-CENTURY WITH THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE: THE MEMOIRS OF STANLEY
S. SURREY (Lawrence Zelenak & Ajay K. Mehrotra eds., 2022).
73
HOWARD, supra note 16, at 3; Gravelle, supra note 15, at 406.
74
HOWARD, supra note 16, at 3.
75
Id.; HACKER, supra note 16, at 13–14.
76
BILAL HABIB, EDWARD HARRIS, JOHN MCCLELLAND & JOSEPH ROSENBERG, CONG. BUDGET
OFF., THE DISTRIBUTION OF MAJOR TAX EXPENDITURES IN 2019, at 10 (Scott Craver ed., 2021).
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According to the U.S Congress’s Joint Committee on Taxation, social
welfare-related tax expenditures were among the largest tax breaks provided
to individuals in fiscal year 2021. In fact, the largest tax expenditure in that
year, of roughly $190 billion, went to the exclusion of employers’
contributions for employees’ medical insurance premiums and medical
care.77 Similarly, the third- and fifth-largest tax expenditures were for taxqualified retirement savings accounts, totaling in the aggregate an estimated
$267 billion.78 Finally, the federal government’s ostensibly most robust antipoverty program, the EITC, accounted for over $73 billion.79
Although most Americans may not realize they benefit from tax
expenditures, the socioeconomic distribution of such indirect government
spending mainly helps upper- and middle-class taxpayers. Because many of
these benefits are generally tied to employment, the top two tax expenditures
in 2019 were for the tax exclusion related to employer-provided health
insurance and retirement security. According to the Congressional Budget
Office, the leading 2019 tax expenditure of employment-based health
insurance went to higher-income households, with 44% of the indirect
spending accruing to households in the highest quintile of the income
distribution.80 By contrast, only 11% of this benefit went to the bottom two
quintiles combined.81 This is not to say that tax expenditures do not help the
poor. The main U.S. anti-poverty measure, the EITC, is generally among the
country’s largest annual tax expenditures. And, in 2019, 82% of the benefits
from the EITC accrued to households in the two lowest quintiles.82
In some cases, the indirect spending associated with specific tax
expenditures surpasses the entire budgets of departments that spend money
for related purposes. The value of tax breaks for homeownership, for
instance, exceeds total spending by the U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development.83 Even though these tax benefits are distributed
unevenly, with upper-income taxpayers benefiting, on average, more than
77
STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 117TH CONG., REP. ON ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX
EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2019–2023, at 28 (2019).
78
Id. at 29. For a full list of the leading tax expenditures, see OFF. OF TAX ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP’T OF
THE TREAS., TAX EXPENDITURES (2020), https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/131/Tax-Expenditures2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/9FL2-PYBX].
79
STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, supra note 77, at 29. For more on the EITC, see Hilary Hoynes,
The Earned Income Tax Credit, 686 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 180, 180–93 (2019); and
Anne L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitations of Tax-Based Welfare Reform,
108 HARV. L. REV. 533, 533–36 (1994).
80
HABIB ET AL., supra note 76, at 12.
81
Id.
82
Id. at 2, 14.
83
What Are the Largest Tax Expenditures?, TAX POL’Y CTR., https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/
briefing-book/what-are-largest-tax-expenditures [https://perma.cc/5SY6-HFCS].
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low-income taxpayers,84 overall knowledge about these tax breaks seems to
be elusive. Many taxpayers either don’t realize they are eligible for these tax
benefits, or when they do, they underestimate the magnitude and importance
of these tax expenditures.85
It is not only through the Internal Revenue Code that the United States
obscures its social welfare spending. The methods that are used to further
social policy also give the false impression that the public sector and public
policy are absent; that somehow private spending on social welfare has
emerged autonomously and separate from American politics and public
policy. Scholars often refer to this distinctive U.S. system as a hybrid model
of social spending or as the uniquely “America[n] public-private welfare
regime.”86 As political scientist Jacob Hacker has explained:
[P]rivate benefits, although nominally situated in the private sector, have
become an essential adjunct to public social programs in the United States. They
are systematically intertwined with public policy. They are molded by
government intervention. They are fought over by political leaders. They are
championed by groups that wish to preserve and expand them. The rise of
private social benefits in the United States, in short, is as much a political story
as the rise of public social benefits, and no less defining of America’s distinctive
path.87

Simply put, one cannot accurately gauge the extent of the American social
welfare state without acknowledging how U.S. lawmakers have harnessed
private power to enact public social welfare policies.
The concealed nature of American social policy further exacerbates the
public’s limited knowledge and misperception of the role of the public
sector. 88 Looking beyond tax expenditures and public/private healthcare and
retirement savings, scholars have shown that even more obvious forms of
government assistance go unheeded by most everyday Americans. Consider
student loans. As political scientist Suzanne Mettler has demonstrated,
84
DANIEL BERGER & ERIC TODER, DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX
EXPENDITURES AFTER THE 2017 TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT 5–6 (2019).
85
See Jacob Goldin & Yair Listokin, Tax Expenditure Salience, 16 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 144, 148
(2014) (reporting survey findings for taxpayers’ understanding of the charitable deduction and the home
mortgage interest deduction).
86
HACKER, supra note 16, at 6–12.
87
Id. at 8. For more on the historical origins and development of the divided American social welfare
state, see generally JENNIFER KLEIN, FOR ALL THESE RIGHTS: BUSINESS, LABOR, AND THE SHAPING OF
AMERICA’S PUBLIC-PRIVATE WELFARE STATE 2–4 (2003); and MOLLY C. MICHELMORE, TAX AND
SPEND: THE WELFARE STATE, TAX POLITICS, AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN LIBERALISM 1–16 (2012).
88
METTLER, supra note 16, at 3–4. More specifically, Mettler defines the “submerged state” as
including “a conglomeration of federal policies that function by providing incentives, subsidies, or
payments to private organizations or households to encourage or reimburse them for conducting activities
deemed to serve a public purpose.” Id. at 4.
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education loans once benefited from government subsidies provided to thirdparty private lenders.89 Although the policy was eventually eliminated with
the federal government taking more direct control over student loans, the
dramatic change went little noticed by borrowers or others.90
The example of government-subsidized student loans highlights the
political importance of optics. It demonstrates how the “submerged state”
obscures the vital role of the public sector from the clear view of the general
public, including those who are frequently the primary beneficiaries of these
laws and policies. This invisibility not only makes the electorate oblivious to
the positive role of government; it also makes them more passive. It conceals
the state and amplifies the market. It marginalizes the public sector and
magnifies the private realm. When government largess is provided indirectly
via tax expenditures or funneled through third-party private institutions,
citizens, taxpayers, and voters do not have a full understanding of how power
operates. As a result, democratic deliberations are diminished, public
opinions are distorted, and voters are left disengaged.91
The historical combination of an extractive fiscal state and shrouded
social welfare spending has created a type of political cognitive dissonance.
At times, Americans rail against an overintrusive government, yet they
continue to enjoy the benefits of the public sector. Indeed, there appears to
be a longstanding and odd disjuncture between American beliefs about
governance and reality. As early as 1887, noted American journalist Albert
Shaw acutely observed this tension. “The average American has an
unequalled capacity for the entertainment of legal fictions and kindred
delusions,” wrote Shaw. “He lives in one world of theory and in another
world of practice . . .” “[T]he people of the United States have assiduously
pursued and cherished a practical policy utterly inconsistent with [laissezfaire] theory and have not perceived the discrepancy.”92
A century later, U.S. lawmakers echoed Shaw’s consternation about
this incongruity. During his 1984 run for the presidency, U.S. Senator Ernest
“Fritz” Hollings famously delivered several versions of a story about
a guy who came home from the Korean War, went to college on a form of the
GI Bill, opened a business with a Small Business Administration loan, made
sure his parents’ farm was adequately wired through Rural Electrification and
irrigated with assistance from the Army Corps of Engineers, saw his kids get
89

Id. at 69–87.
Id.
91
Id. at 5–6.
92
William J. Novak, The Myth of the “Weak” American State, 113 AM. HIST. REV. 752, 753 (2008)
(quoting Albert Shaw, The American State and the American Man, 51 CONTEMP. REV. 695,
696–97 (1887)).
90
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subsidized school lunches at a school that received lab equipment from a
National Science Foundation grant, got his mortgage from the FHA and
hurricane disaster relief from FEMA, and one day, took AMTRAK to
Washington to complain to his congressman about getting big government off
people’s back.93

The mental misalignment between political beliefs and actual behavior
continues to afflict American law and statecraft.
In many ways, this political cognitive dissonance has come to
exacerbate the distrust between citizens and their government—a distrust
fueled by many leaders on the political right. Roughly four decades ago,
Republican President Ronald Reagan articulated and advanced this
sentiment when he famously announced, “[G]overnment is not the solution
to our problem; government is the problem.”94 Reagan’s denouncement was
part and parcel of a long historical process of politicizing the public sector—
and the taxes that support it.95
As part of that process, many conservative politicians began
perpetuating the myth that Americans were overtaxed compared to citizens
of other advanced, industrialized nations. “I oppose any new spending
programs which will increase the tax burden,” President Richard Nixon
proclaimed in 1972 as he accepted the Republican Party’s presidential
nomination.96 “The truth is that Americans are overtaxed, not undertaxed,”
Jack Kemp claimed in 1993.97 “Besides, it’s not the people who need to
sacrifice, it’s the bloated Government.”98 More recently, false claims about
high American taxes have also provided political cover for tax cuts. “The
people of this country want tax cuts; they want lower taxes,” President
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Donald Trump repeatedly (and mistakenly) asserted. “We’re the highest
taxed nation in the world.”99
Despite these claims, there is little empirical evidence to support the
fable of the “overtaxed” American. Even a perfunctory review of wellknown statistics shows that the United States is a stark outlier in how little it
taxes its citizens. Turning once again to OECD data, one can clearly see that
the United States is among the least taxed developed nations in the world.100
For 2020, the United States had a total taxes/GDP ratio of 25.5%, well below
the OECD average of nearly 34%, and far below other affluent countries
such as France (45%), the United Kingdom (33%), and Germany (38%).101
Moreover, the spread between U.S. taxes and the OECD average has been
relatively consistent since 1965.102
Analyzing comparative tax data in other ways reinforces the claim that
the United States remains a relatively low-tax country. When one examines
tax revenue per capita, the United States is above the OECD average but still
well behind other leading industrialized economies such as France,
Germany, and the Nordic countries, which have the most robust social
welfare states.103
To use another measure, consider the average income earner. A single
worker with no children earning the average income in the United States has
an effective or average tax rate of 28%, meaning that they retain
approximately 72% of their annual income post-tax.104 The OECD average
tax rate for a similarly situated taxpayer is nearly 35%.105 When one
99
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incorporates consumption taxes—in the form of VATs or sales taxes—into
the analysis, the United States remains well below the OECD average for the
total tax burden on labor.106
One explanation for the gap between the United States and other OECD
countries is the conspicuous absence of a broad-based national U.S.
consumption tax. Whereas all other OECD countries have such a levy,
usually in the form of a VAT, the United States has throughout its modern
fiscal history rejected any type of comprehensive federal tax on
consumption, including even crude forms of a VAT. Because the VAT
accounts, on average, for almost 7% of total taxes/GDP among OECD
countries, the missing U.S. VAT explains much of the U.S. shortfall in total
taxation as a percentage of GDP.107
III. HISTORICAL U.S. RESISTANCE TO NATIONAL CONSUMPTION TAXES
What explains the historical American resistance to broad-based
national consumption taxes? Why is the United States the only OECD
country without a VAT? Part of the answer to these questions may rest with
the relationship between robust VATs and resilient social welfare states. As
we have seen, there is a growing amount of empirical evidence linking
regressive consumption taxes with progressive social spending.108 Some
commentators point to this correlation to suggest that a VAT lacks political
support in the United States, from both sides of the aisle.
The regressive incidence of consumption taxes along with their
potential to fund strong social welfare states may explain part of the
historical American resistance to the VAT. Indeed, there is an old
Washington, D.C., “inside-the-beltway” adage, often attributed—
apocryphally perhaps—to Harvard University economist and former U.S.
Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers, which states that the VAT has failed
in the United States because liberals fear that it will harm low-income
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Americans with its regressive incidence, and conservatives fear that it will
be a “money machine” for big government.109
There may be a great deal of truth to the adage. But understanding
empirically why American liberals and conservatives have resisted national
consumption taxes requires a comparative and historical analysis of how
these political preferences have come into existence and been shaped over
time. Complex and changing historical contexts, both in the United States
and abroad, have influenced how Americans have come to think about fiscal
policy, about progressive taxation and social spending. Broad forces,
seminal events, and the actions of key actors have all come together during
pivotal and contingent historical moments to determine the development of
American law and political economy.
To borrow language from the historical social sciences: the U.S.
resistance to the VAT can be viewed as part of the “path-dependent process”
of policymaking.110 During previous “critical junctures,” American
lawmakers “locked in” U.S. fiscal policy down a particular path, with
specific decisions that have subsequently created “feedback mechanisms”
that may have ossified the U.S. resistance to broad national consumption
taxes in general and the value-added tax in particular.111 Although path
dependency theory is not always clear about what constitutes “critical
junctures” and how “locked in” certain policies become, the general concept
is helpful in understanding the historical contingency of contemporary
American fiscal policy.112 It helps demonstrate that there is nothing natural,
neutral, or necessary about the way we tax and spend today. In short, the past
matters in understanding the missing U.S. VAT today.
A historical and comparative analysis shows that rejecting national
consumption taxes was not the only path available to the United States.
Throughout modern U.S. fiscal history, namely the long twentieth century,
109

Jan M. Rosen, Tax Watch: The Likely Forms of New Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1988,
at D2, https://www.nytimes.com/1988/12/19/business/tax-watch-the-likely-forms-of-new-taxes.html
[https://perma.cc/T96M-X5NS]; Robert J. Barro, The Coming Crises of Governments, FIN. TIMES, Aug.
3, 2011, at 9, https://scholar.harvard.edu/barro/files/11_0803_thecomingcrises_ft.pdf [https://perma.cc/
P3M9-ALY7]. Summers is purported to have said about a U.S. VAT: “‘Liberals think it’s regressive and
conservatives think it’s a money machine.’ If they reverse their positions, a V.A.T. may happen . . . .”
Rosen, supra, at D2.
110
See PAUL PIERSON, POLITICS IN TIME: HISTORY, INSTITUTIONS, AND SOCIAL ANALYSIS 17–22,
73, 85 (2004); JAMES, supra note 20, at 206–09.
111
W. Brian Arthur, Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by Historical Events,
99 ECON. J. 116, 117, 127 (1989). For an example of how path dependency theory has shaped corporate
law, see generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate
Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127 (1999).
112
On the limits of path dependency theory, see generally Adrian Kay, A Critique of the Use of Path
Dependency in Policy Studies, 83 PUB. ADMIN. 553, 554–55 (2005).

174

117:151 (2022)

The Missing U.S. VAT

there were several “critical junctures,” or historically contingent moments,
when American policymakers could have adopted a crude form of general
federal consumption taxes but chose not to. In fact, well before France
became the first nation-state to adopt a modern VAT in 1954,113 Western
industrialized countries were experimenting with simple forms of business
sales taxes, frequently referred to as “turnover” taxes because they were
imposed on the turnover of business inventory.114 These early turnover taxes
were rudimentary and imperfect business activity taxes that eventually
evolved into modern VATs.115
In many cases, the emerging modern VATs complemented, rather than
replaced, existing income tax regimes. Over time, these VATs became fiscal
workhorses funding strong social welfare states.116 If the United States had
adopted even a crude federal consumption tax during earlier critical
junctures, it might have followed the path of other advanced, industrialized
countries towards a modern VAT. Thus, this Part explores several earlier
periods of historical contingency—when political, social, and economic
conditions suggested that U.S. fiscal policy was “up for grabs”—to begin the
process of trying to understand why the United States continues to be a VAT
laggard.117
There have been at least three pivotal periods in modern American
fiscal history when the United States explored, but eventually rejected,
national consumption taxes.118 These periods share two key characteristics.
First, in each of these episodes, the historical context afforded experts,
lawmakers, and social groups the opportunity to reimagine American fiscal
113
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policy. Broad, deep-seated forces for reform provided the necessary
backdrop, while seminal events, like global wars and other national
emergencies, acted as triggers launching new ideas and policy prescriptions.
Second, and perhaps most importantly, key historical actors, from leading
experts—mainly economists and lawyers119—to legislators and politicians,
to ordinary citizens working through voluntary associations, came to shape
the future of American fiscal policy.
A. The Failed Post-World War I Attempt
From the late-nineteenth century to the ratification of the Sixteenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution in 1913,120 widespread forces for
reform helped build the modern American fiscal state.121 Leading experts,
lawmakers, and social groups challenged the prevailing system of indirect
and regressive taxes associated mainly with the nineteenth-century national
tariff. In its place, these reformers sought to install a new fiscal regime, one
based on the principle of “ability to pay,” which had at its core the direct and
progressive taxation of individual income and business profits.122 This new
tax system became the foundation for a revolution in American
fiscal governance.
At the height of World War I, the unprecedented demand for
government revenue to wage a global conflict built upon this foundation. In
the process, the Great War became a seminal event that fundamentally
transformed the U.S. tax system, and nearly every part of American society
and the economy.123 Before the war, the federal income tax was an anemic
source of national revenue. In 1913, Congress enacted a mildly progressive
national income tax that raised little federal revenue but sought to recalibrate
the distribution of tax burdens according to the concept of ability to pay.124
Six years later, the international conflict revolutionized the income tax
into a muscular fiscal machine. During the war, tax rates skyrocketed, and
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exemption levels dropped. Whereas the top marginal income tax rate was
only 7% in 1913, by 1919, at the tail end of WWI, the top rate had jumped
to 77%.125 During the same period, exemption levels dropped to the point
where nearly 20% of American wage earners were on federal tax rolls, an
enormous increase from roughly 2% in the prewar period.126 At the same
time, innovative and highly complex “excess profits” taxes were levied on
businesses, and an array of excise taxes was imposed on numerous everyday
goods, from gasoline to chewing gum. Unlike other war participants, the
United States funded a large portion of its war efforts with direct and
progressive taxes on individuals and businesses.127 Led by Democratic
President Woodrow Wilson, the federal government actively transformed
nearly every part of American state, society, and economy during the war.128
After the war, conservative Republicans swept into national political
office and took control of policymaking. Elected in the wake of the war,
these new leaders focused on economic retrenchment as an integral part of a
“return to normalcy.”129 Their primary target quickly became the robust
wartime fiscal state. Led by the new Treasury Secretary, Andrew W. Mellon,
Republicans sought to slash top marginal tax rates, abolish the complex
wartime profits taxes, and provide generous tax benefits to owners of
capital.130 On the other side of the political aisle, many progressive
lawmakers and populist social groups wanted to retain the high “surtax” rates
and the innovative wartime business levies to pay off war debts, fund a
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veterans bonus, and perhaps even regulate large corporations.131 During this
political conflict, the broader American economy witnessed a severe, albeit
brief, postwar recession, which brought further scrutiny to fiscal policy.
Consequently, many Americans of all political stripes were open to
fundamental tax reform.132
A comprehensive national consumption tax quickly became a popular
idea at the time among several key historical actors. In 1920 and 1921,
numerous business leaders recommended a “spending tax” to replace the
income tax and the excess profits levies. Republican lawmakers, led by Utah
Senator Reed Smoot and New York Congressman Ogden Mills, advanced a
variety of consumption taxes, or “spending taxes” as they put it, that
gradually gained some legislative traction.133 Yet what was most intriguing
about this pivotal postwar period was the idea of a proto-VAT proposed by
Thomas S. Adams, a leading U.S. Treasury Department official and Yale
University political economist.
Adams had a long and distinguished career as a “scholar in politics.” 134
When he was a professor at the University of Wisconsin–Madison, Adams
played a central role in advancing the Badger State’s first effective income
tax, which soon became a model for many other states and
commonwealths.135 During the war, Adams was also a principal
spokesperson for the Treasury Department in congressional hearings; many
of his studies and proposals were adopted during the conflict.136 And even
after the war, Adams was an influential figure in designing international tax
laws and policies.137
Adams’s primary goal in the postwar period was to preserve the
progressive income tax. He agreed with some government critics that the
wartime tax regime, with its high marginal tax rates and complex war profits
taxes, had become an administrative burden for both the government and

131
Anne Alstott & Benjamin Novick, War, Taxes, and Income Redistribution in the Twenties: The
1924 Veterans’ Bonus and the Defeat of the Mellon Plan, 59 N.Y.U. TAX L. REV. 373, 374 (2006); PAUL
DICKSON & THOMAS B. ALLEN, THE BONUS ARMY: AN AMERICAN EPIC 25–31 (Dover Publ’ns, Inc.
2020) (2004).
132
BROWNLEE, supra note 22, at 61; Bank, supra note 118, at 2241–42.
133
BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra note 130, at 201, 203; Bank, supra note 118, at 2243.
134
A. E. Holcomb, George A. Boissard’s Tribute to Thomas Sewell Adams, 18 BULL. NAT’L TAX
ASS’N 194, 194 (1933); Michael J. Graetz & Michael M. O’Hear, The “Original Intent” of U.S.
International Taxation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1021, 1032 (1997).
135
W. ELLIOT BROWNLEE, PROGRESSIVISM AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: THE WISCONSIN INCOME
TAX, 1911–1929, at 62 (1974); MEHROTRA, supra note 9, at 231–48.
136
BROWNLEE, supra note 135, at 60, 110; MEHROTRA, supra note 9, at 335–39.
137
Graetz & O’Hear, supra note 134, at 1028–41.

178

117:151 (2022)

The Missing U.S. VAT

taxpayers.138 Yet, unlike the conservative lawmakers who sought to replace
the income tax with a consumption tax, Adams had a more sophisticated
vision of combining moderate progressive income taxes with a new business
sales tax, and a series of lighter excise levies on commodities.139
In a seminal 1921 journal article, Adams made the case for the
administrative simplicity and economic efficiency of his tax reform vision.
“[T]he simple truth is that we are overburdening the income tax,” Adams
wrote.140 “Nothing is more common in the history of taxation than the
demoralization of what has been a good tax, as taxes go, by increasing its
rates until the breaking point is reached.”141 To ease the burden on the income
tax, Adams proposed a unique “modified business sales tax” as a
replacement for the war profits taxes. “In the case of producers and sellers
of ‘goods, wares and merchandise’ further simplicity could be achieved,” he
wrote, “by giving the tax the form of a sales tax with a credit or refund for
taxes paid by the producer or dealer (as purchaser) on goods bought for resale
or for necessary use in the production of goods for sale.”142 With this
proposal, Adams provided the first conceptual articulation of what tax
experts today would call a “credit-invoice” method of value-added
taxation.143 Adams was, thus, one of the intellectual fountainheads of
the VAT.144
Adams was also a political realist. After several decades traversing
between the academy and policymaking, he understood that economic logic
and administrative simplicity did not exist in a vacuum. Broader social and
political forces often determined the shape of tax law and fiscal policy. The
U.S. victory in World War I, for example, seemed to assure the permanency
of progressive income taxes. Because the United States had successfully
138
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waged a global war with highly progressive income and complex war profits
levies, Adams realized that few Americans would be willing to sacrifice the
apparent fairness and effectiveness of the existing progressive income tax
regime for a supposedly simpler yet possibly less equitable alternative. The
democratic and popular will for fairness and equity would be difficult
to overcome.
Indeed, Adams acknowledged the futility of his ideas. “The plan has
little chance of adoption,” Adams presciently observed about his proto-VAT
proposal.145 But that did not mean that one could not learn from this potential
failure. In words that would resonate for decades as future U.S. policy
makers and analysts considered other forms of national consumption taxes,
Adams eloquently explained how and why the democratic desire for fairness
and equity always seemed to overcome the economic logic of simplicity and
administrative ease. The failure to adopt a consumption tax serves “the useful
purpose of illustrating the futility of basing one’s principles on one’s
personal experience,” Adams conceded:
It demonstrates the supreme necessity of subordinating administrative logic and
personal predilections to the great political and social forces which control the
evolution of tax systems. These forces must be accepted as facts. The historical
fact is that modern states prefer equity and complexity to simplicity and
inequality. The cry for equality and justice is louder and more unanswerable
than the demand for certainty and convenience. You may think it sentimental
and stupid, but that does not alter the fact.146

Adams’s prediction soon came true. Although Senator Smoot proposed
several types of “general sales taxes” during the 1921 legislative session,
including a proposal that vaguely resembled Adams’s proto-VAT, none of
them was adopted by Congress.147 The crude “spending taxes” championed
by Smoot and others might have evolved over time into something
resembling a VAT. Like European countries experimenting with a general
sales tax at the time, the United States in 1921 could have adopted a broadbased national sales tax; doing so may have put U.S. fiscal policy on a
different historical path—one that might have led to the subsequent adoption
of a U.S. VAT and perhaps even a more vigorous social welfare state.
Whereas European counterparts had crude forms of consumption (turnover)
taxes in place that permitted them in later years to refine their commitment
to taxing consumption, the United States had no such foundation—no history
of effectively taxing consumption broadly at the national level. Thus, during
145
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147
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this critical juncture in global tax history, some nation-states appeared to
have been more open and flexible than others.
One reason why the 1921 consumption tax proposals failed was the
fractured support among business leaders. While some industrialists were
eager to have a sales tax replace the wartime focus on progressive income
and profits taxes, others were more concerned about the economic
uncertainty of a new tax base. Anxious about how a new general sales tax
might affect their bottom line, some businesses preferred to stick with a levy
that was more predictable rather than experiment with a new tax that might
have an adverse impact, especially during an ongoing economic recession.148
Others in the business community feared the political implications of
moving from a highly progressive tax regime to a potentially regressive one.
The National Industrial Conference Board, a leading business association
created during the war, concluded that supporting a sales tax was
“indefensible.”149 The Conference Board believed that the distributional
consequences of shifting from progressive income and profits taxes to a
regressive sales tax undermined their promotion of good corporate fiscal
citizenship. The committee explained:
We haven’t the nerve, as good citizens of the country—which we believe we
are, and are trying to be—to say to a body of business men in this country, who
are suggesting that business be relieved from a billion dollars of excess profits
tax, that we propose a tax which will cause the billion to be paid by the ultimate
consumer. That is such a violent divergence from the principle of payment upon
the basis of ability to pay, that we cannot ask this body of businessmen to get
behind that sort of tax. . . .
We don’t think that is good citizenship; and we don’t think that is good
economics. That is the real reason that we . . . rejected the sales tax, upon the
assumption that the tax is paid by the ultimate consumer.150

Thus, it was generally conservative business interests in 1921 that were
uncertain and anxious about the regressive incidence of a sales tax.
Progressive advocates, who were eager to maintain the wartime tax
regime, seized upon the business community’s ambivalence. Organized
labor and agricultural associations and their representatives in Congress
came out strongly against the sales tax proposals.151 As petitions from farm
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federations and labor unions opposing the sales tax poured into congressional
offices, leaders of these organizations testified before Congress about the
unfairness of shifting to a consumption tax. “I believe that if the sales tax
was substituted for the higher surtax brackets and the excess profits tax,”
proclaimed H.S. McKenzie of the American Farm Bureau Federation, “you
would be putting an undue burden on the people who are already heavily
burdened under the present tax rate.”152
Just as Adams had predicted, the popular demand for fairness and the
democratic desire for equity triumphed over administrative calls for
efficiency and simplicity. Ultimately, the early-1920s potential for a
profound change to the U.S. tax system dissipated into Treasury Secretary
Mellon’s grand plan for “scientific” tax reform based on tax cuts for the
wealthiest Americans.153 Thus, during the country’s first opportunity to
experiment with a broad-based national consumption tax, concerns about the
regressive incidence of consumption taxes triumphed among both traditional
groups on the political left, as well as some conservative business leaders.
B. Later Unsuccessful Efforts
The early-1920s attempt at a comprehensive national consumption tax
may have marked the conceptual beginnings of the first serious U.S.
consideration of a proto-VAT. But it was not the only historically contingent
moment in the twentieth-century history of American fiscal policy. A second
pivotal period occurred during the 1930s and 1940s when a new era of
national crises, namely the Great Depression and the start of World War II,
provided tax experts, national lawmakers, and social groups with another
opportunity to reconsider broad-based national consumption taxes.
As historian Joseph J. Thorndike has persuasively shown, New Deal tax
policy was rooted in the prior Republican response to the Great
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Depression.154 During the early years of the Depression, the economic
orthodoxy of balancing budgets dominated fiscal policymaking. The
economic downturn devasted federal revenues, and by 1932 lawmakers were
scrambling to find ways to increase revenue and balance the budget. Even
conservative Republicans, like Mellon, conceded that a tax hike
was necessary.
A variety of proposals were floated. President Herbert Hoover’s
administration recommended increasing individual and corporate income tax
rates and lowering exemption levels for the personal income tax, as well as
enacting a variety of excise taxes on an array of goods. The Hoover Treasury
Department was led in late 1932 by the newly appointed Ogden Mills, after
Mellon had been appointed ambassador to England. Although Mills had
recommended a sales tax in 1921, and even alluded to the success of the
1930s Canadian general sales tax, he was reluctant to return to a failed
proposal in his new, more powerful role. Instead, Mills echoed the
administration’s view that higher and broader income taxes along with more
excise taxes on a variety of goods were the sound way to raise badly
needed revenue.155
Others disagreed. The businesses affected by the tax hikes, particularly
by the long list of excise taxes, protested. They recommended, instead, a
general sales tax on all goods. In his testimony before the House Ways and
Means Committee, T.S. Adams refrained from advocating for his protoVAT. The harsh lessons of 1921 may have still resonated with him. Still,
Adams described the Canadian general sales tax in glowing terms, indicating
that perhaps it was time for the United States to experiment with a broadbased national consumption tax.156 The anti-income-tax publisher William
Randolph Hearst went even further in his support for a general sales tax as a
replacement for the income tax. He financed a trip to Canada for U.S.
policymakers to show them how the levy operated in that country. And he
followed up his generosity with a publicity campaign in his newspapers
“against the . . . Bolshevist system of income taxation.”157
The powerful U.S. House Ways and Means Committee appeared
persuaded by the sales tax proponents. In late 1932, it recommended a
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“manufacturers’ sales tax” of 2.25% on all items except food.158 But once
again, “the great political and social forces which control the evolution of
tax systems,” as Adams noted, shaped tax policy.159 A fractured business
community remained divided on a general sales tax. Retailers staunchly
opposed it. Manufacturers tentatively supported it. And those in specialized
industries that were potentially impacted by the proposed excise taxes much
preferred a general sales tax over the long list of particularized commodity
taxes.160
Organizations representing everyday Americans, such as organized
labor and agrarian associations, strongly opposed the general sales tax
proposal, just as they had in 1921. In language reminiscent of the 1921
battles, the American Federation of Labor declared the sales tax an unfair
burden on working citizens.161 Similarly, the American Farm Bureau
Federation reiterated its consistent objection. “A general sales tax is
constantly opposed by the Farm Bureau for the broad reason that it is based
on the necessity to consume rather than the ability to pay,” declared one
agricultural leader.162
Ultimately, the argument that a general sales tax—as opposed to
particular excise taxes—affected the “necessity to consume” convinced most
lawmakers to reject the 1932 proposals for a “general sales tax.” Rank-andfile Democrats as well as a group of progressive Republicans came out
against the sales tax, much to the chagrin of Senator Reed Smoot, who once
again voiced his support for broad-based federal consumption taxes.163
Yet it was not simply the regressive incidence of consumption taxes that
won the day. Instead, lawmakers focused on the element of volition that
undergirded the difference between excise taxes and a general sales tax. They
reasoned that a comprehensive national sales tax would affect nearly all
goods and thus force all Americans to pay the levy in one way or another.
By contrast, a series of isolated excise taxes, even a growing list of them,
allowed people to choose whether to consume taxed goods. Excise taxes
were, to be sure, regressive. But tax incidence was only one element of tax
equity. In this sense, consumer choice became a touchstone of tax fairness.
Similar calls to balance consumer choice against the need for greater revenue
would be seen a decade later when another crisis hit American fiscal policy.
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In the early 1940s, the United States once again considered adopting a
general national consumption tax. Crisis once again became the crucible for
a possible fiscal transformation. In fact, just as the end of the First World
War and onset of the Great Depression provided the historical plasticity to
reconsider the federal government’s primary tax base, so too did the start of
World War II.
Led mainly by Republican legislators in Congress, and backed by
business interests, the idea of a general sales tax once again gained
momentum in the early 1940s.164 Many supporters wanted a widespread and
flat sales tax to replace the existing array of excise taxes on specific goods—
an administratively simple and efficient tax scheme, similar to the one
Adams had proposed. Others hoped that a general sales tax might still replace
the progressive income tax entirely. Once the United States formally entered
World War II, the tremendous need for government revenue and concerns
about rising inflation led to increased interest in a general sales tax. Although
President Franklin D. Roosevelt remained staunchly opposed to any type of
broad-based federal consumption tax, his Treasury Department attempted to
strike a compromise between congressional and business leaders on the one
hand and Democratic lawmakers on the other.165
On September 3, 1942, as Congress was considering a new tax bill,
Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau proposed what was arguably the most
innovative proposal since Adams’s proto-VAT: a progressive sales tax.166
The Treasury recommendation was hardly simple or straightforward.
Designed to supplement rather than replace the income tax, Morgenthau’s
complex proposal combined a flat 10% tax, refundable after the war, on all
spending with a graduated spending tax that ranged from 10% to 75%. The
proposal built upon earlier Treasury studies, including those conducted by
T.S. Adams.167
Morgenthau’s attempt at a compromise was futile and fleeting.
Reminiscent of Adams’s remarks, Morgenthau’s proposal offered neither
equity nor simplicity. Like most flat rate consumption taxes, it had a
regressive bent. And with a complicated refund scheme, Morgenthau’s plan
was hardly a model of administrative simplicity.
Without any support from President Roosevelt and few advocates in
Congress, the progressive spending tax was set to fail. Indeed, the Senate
Finance Committee rejected the proposal almost immediately. Washington
Post reporter Robert C. Albright summarized the ill-fated proposal when he
164
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wrote that the spending tax was “Morgenthau’s morning glory — It opened
Tuesday morning and it folded before noon.”168 Like its predecessors from
the 1920s and 1930s, the failed 1942 national consumption tax foreclosed a
possible path of fiscal development. Although it is impossible to predict what
might have happened if President Roosevelt had supported Morgenthau’s
progressive spendings tax proposal, some scholars have suggested that it is
possible that the United States might have emerged from World War II with
a two-tax structure: a progressive income tax imposed mainly on the wealthy,
and a comprehensive national consumption tax, perhaps even a VAT, levied
more broadly on nearly all spending.169
If the two world wars and the Great Depression provided the crisis
context for the early considerations of a national consumption tax, a third
seminal moment came during a different type of crisis—a perceived crisis in
educational financing. During the early 1970s, the presidential
administration of Richard M. Nixon proposed a national VAT to fund
education.170 Once again, legal and economic experts played a pivotal role in
both advancing the national consumption tax idea and in some cases
opposing it. But unlike the past when crude forms of a proto-VAT or a
progressive spendings tax were recommended, Nixon administration
economists, led by Paul McCracken and lawyers such as Treasury official
Edwin S. Cohen, favored a fully formed VAT that could raise sufficient
revenue to underwrite a variety of social programs. Some of Nixon’s aides
were attracted to the idea of a national VAT. In an attempt to address growing
social concerns about the financing of K–12 education, and to build his
electoral base, Nixon proposed replacing local property taxes with a federal
VAT to finance education.171
The origins of Nixon’s education VAT began in 1969 with some initial
discussions about adopting a VAT to help close a widening federal budget
deficit.172 Those discussions were quickly tabled, but not forgotten. Over the
next two years, President Nixon created task forces and advisory
168
Bank, supra note 118, at 2249 (quoting Robert C. Albright, Gallery Glimpses, WASH. POST, Sept.
6, 1942, at B3).
169
For a description of such an alternative history, see Zelenak, supra note 118, at 173–74.
170
JAMES, supra note 20, at 344–47; Alan Schenk, Prior U.S. Flirtations with VAT, in THE VAT
READER, supra note 18, at 52–63; ISAAC WILLIAM MARTIN, THE PERMANENT TAX REVOLT: HOW THE
PROPERTY TAX TRANSFORMED AMERICAN POLITICS 82–83 (2008); Monoka Venters, Meghan V. Hauptli
& Lora Cohen-Vogel, Federal Solutions to School Fiscal Crises: Lessons from Nixon’s Failed National
Sales Tax for Education, 26 EDUC. POL’Y 35, 44–46 (2012).
171
Venters et al., supra note 170, at 44–49 (discussing President Nixon’s idea to replace property
taxes with a national consumption tax for education).
172
ALLEN J. MATUSOW, NIXON’S ECONOMY: BOOMS, BUSTS, DOLLARS AND VOTES 51–53 (1998).
See generally LEONARD SILK, NIXONOMICS: HOW THE DISMAL SCIENCE OF FREE ENTERPRISE BECAME
THE BLACK ART OF CONTROLS (1972).

186

117:151 (2022)

The Missing U.S. VAT

commissions to explore the details of a possible U.S. VAT, including one
linking a VAT to revenue-sharing grants to states and local governments.173
By 1971, his administration was working on a proposal that sought to replace
local property taxes with a federal VAT to finance K–12 education.
The revolutionary idea of using a broad federal consumption tax to fund
education, like its predecessors, was short-lived. Within a year, the growing
opposition to Nixon’s VAT undermined the proposal. Many of the same
elements that had weakened support for earlier broad federal consumption
taxes were evident in the 1970s. A skittish business community and a hostile
Congress once again posed familiar, formidable obstacles. Liberal analysts
and lawmakers continued to object to the regressive incidence of
consumption taxes. Businesses remained nervous about a consumption tax’s
effect on consumption and, hence, their ultimate profits. And Congress
continued to hesitate at the prospect of new taxes on its constituents. 174
What’s more, by the 1970s, there was a new barrier—one that
exemplified the path-dependent structure of U.S. opposition to the VAT. By
the post-World War II period, many state and local governments had come
to rely on sales taxes as their central source of revenue. A federal tax
dependent on the same tax base, namely consumption, appeared to be a
challenge to subnational governments. The vertical competition of fiscal
federalism appeared to be a serious threat. Consequently, many governors,
mayors, and state and local treasury officials lined up against a national
VAT, even though its revenues would have assisted state and local
educational spending.175
Nixon’s VAT was not the last attempt by a national leader to adopt an
American VAT. In 1979, U.S. House Ways and Means Committee Chairman
Al Ullman formally proposed a 10% national VAT. Ullman’s proposal not
only failed, but he also lost his subsequent reelection bid. And many
politicians thereafter became reluctant to recommend any type of national
consumption tax, let alone a VAT.176
While the United States continued to reject the VAT, other developed
countries that were also VAT laggards began in the 1980s to reconsider their
historical resistance to value-added taxes. Indeed, throughout the 1980s,
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several affluent nations, including Australia, Canada, and Japan, adopted a
national VAT.177 Each of these countries had its own particular historical,
social, and political reasons for rejecting VATs earlier. But each was able to
overcome the lock-in effect of decisions made at earlier critical junctures to
put its tax system and society on a new and different path. Path dependency
seemed to have its limits in explaining their reconsideration of a VAT. Thus,
by the dawn of the 1990s, the United States was squarely an outlier as the
only advanced, industrialized country without a VAT.
CONCLUSION AND CODA
It is well-known by now that income and wealth inequalities have been
soaring for the past half-century across the globe. Although some developing
countries have seen a decrease in poverty and a rising middle class during
that period, much of the world has experienced dramatic increases in withincountry economic disparities. In the United States, the growing
concentration of wealth has been particularly pronounced, especially at the
top end of the socioeconomic spectrum. While the details of this increase
have been debated recently by experts, most agree that both income and
wealth inequality have increased significantly.
One prominent obstacle to addressing U.S. inequality has been the
fractured nature of the modern American fiscal and social welfare state. The
combination of a highly salient federal system of direct and progressive
taxation and a more shrouded social welfare state has led to a unique type of
political cognitive dissonance that, in turn, has helped perpetuate the myth
of the “overtaxed” American—a myth that has been exploited by anti-statist
politicians and lawmakers for decades.
This fable has, in part, prevented the United States from joining the rest
of the developed world in adopting a comprehensive national consumption
tax such as a VAT. Whereas most other affluent nation-states have a VAT
that underwrites robust social spending, the United States remains an outlier
in terms of both its fiscal and its social policies. As a result, the United States
is constrained in its ability to generate the large-scale revenues necessary to
fund robust social welfare programs and thus address inequality. Dispelling
the myth of the “overtaxed” American might be the first step toward a
profound restructuring of American fiscal policy—a restructuring that could
include a U.S. VAT to fund new social spending and expand existing antipoverty efforts.
Many of the existing VATs in the developed world gradually emerged
from other cruder forms of consumption taxes that were adopted earlier in
177
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the twentieth century. On several occasions throughout the twentieth
century, the United States had its opportunities to experiment with similar
rudimentary, broad-based consumption taxes. In fact, there were at least
three pivotal periods of historical contingency when the United States could
have adopted a comprehensive federal consumption tax but chose not to.
This Essay has begun the process of examining why there is no U.S.
VAT by identifying three critical junctures in the path-dependent process of
fiscal policymaking. By focusing mainly on the first period of the early
1920s, this Essay has shown how the political, economic, and social
conditions of the post-World War I period provided the backdrop to the ideas
of one prominent tax expert who became the intellectual progenitor of the
VAT. As a pragmatist and political realist, Thomas S. Adams anticipated that
his proto-VAT would have little chance of adoption. It was, as he predicted,
doomed to failure.
Still, there were lessons to be learned from failure—lessons, as Adams
noted, about the “the great political and social forces which control the
evolution of tax systems.”178 Similar lessons might be drawn from the other
historical periods—those moments of similar national crises—when the
plasticity of U.S. fiscal policymaking could have permitted national
experimentation with a comprehensive federal consumption tax. Future
research on the broad forces, seminal events, and key historical agents in
each of these unsuccessful attempts will likely shed further light on the
critical question: why no U.S. VAT?
*

*

*

Yet even if these history lessons can help us prepare for the next fiscal
crisis or critical juncture, there is no guarantee that embracing a U.S. VAT
would mitigate inequality. A U.S. VAT would not be a panacea for
addressing existing economic disparities. Many other countries that have a
VAT and expansive social spending have also witnessed increases in
inequality over the last four decades. Moreover, the current distribution of
tax expenditures suggests that U.S. social spending is not always aimed at
alleviating poverty or combating inequality. Most importantly, the United
States has a particular history, one that is coded with a general skepticism
about centralized authority and a particular racialized view of social
spending, that might prevent it from using a muscular VAT to fund new and
existing social welfare benefits. Thus, adopting a VAT might be just one
necessary but insufficient step in combating the growing concentration
of wealth.
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To be sure, there are many ways to address growing inequality.
Numerous scholars and policymakers have focused mainly on reducing the
top end of inequality by taxing the rich.179 They have recommended, among
a variety of proposals, bolstering the existing system of direct and
progressive taxes by increasing top marginal tax rates, removing the
preference for capital gains, and even adopting new types of wealth taxes.
These are sound ideas. Taxing the rich is, indeed, one way to mitigate highend inequality. But there are other ways to tackle inequality beyond “soaking
the rich,” including elevating more people out of poverty and into the middle
class and addressing the longstanding stagnation of middle-income wages
and post-tax earnings. If one of the goals of progressive reforms aimed at
greater human flourishing is to provide more material support and social
rights for the middle and lower classes, then perhaps we should look beyond
“soaking the rich” to elevating those below. Finding the missing U.S. VAT
might just be one way to begin that process.
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